The Fate of Bangladesh’s Rivers and the Bait of Hilsa Diplomacy

The interim government’s perplexing Hilsa export policy fails to inspire India’s goodwill as it maintains its allegiance to its former vassal while attempting to mend relations with its neighbor
 

 

On August 5, 2024, India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, was tasked with overseeing a critical operation in Bangladesh. As the impending fall of Sheikh Hasina loomed, he had only hours before protestors surged toward Gonobhaban. After 15 years of unwavering Indian support, her tenure was nearing its end. A safe exit was orchestrated, allowing her to flee to India.

 

India’s decision to retain its most loyal regional ally only exacerbated tensions and ignited further public dissent in Bangladesh. By choosing to protect a dictator, India appeared to disregard the aspirations of those advocating for democracy and human rights. Even in the wake of Hasina’s departure, India’s stance reflected a continued indifference toward the ethos of the Monsoon Revolution. In this context, Farida Akhter, an advisor in the interim government, remarked that Bangladesh would no longer be able to export Hilsa to India.

 

Despite this, shortly before his inaugural foreign trip to the UN General Assembly, Muhammad Yunus opted to send Hilsa to India. This decision is likely to be interpreted unfavorably in New Delhi. Any optimism or naive expectations held by Yunus's administration will likely be viewed as indecisiveness among its advisors. This could signal weakness and the onset of an appeasement strategy.

 

India has made its position clear: despite Dhaka’s requests, Prime Minister Narendra Modi shows no interest in engaging with Yunus during the UN General Assembly. Indian Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent remarks in Jharkhand, threatening to hang “Bangladeshi infiltrators,” indicate a strategic intention to instill fear and undermine the Bangladeshi government.

 

This pattern is well-established. Since its independence, whenever Bangladesh has had a government other than the Awami League, India has been known to destabilize the situation. The contrast between India’s support for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and its attempts to disrupt Bangladesh after his assassination in 1975—marked by numerous coup attempts—speaks volumes about this longstanding dynamic.

 

For any society to function effectively, it is essential to maintain law and order, ensuring the community's safety and security. The current fragile state of law and order in Bangladesh creates a scenario ripe for chaos and instability.

 

The Yunus administration will likely find its focus diverted, unable to address pressing issues or confront remnants of fascism domestically, nor effectively counter India’s maneuvers internationally. In time, the government may feel compelled to seek India’s favor to restore calm, while India will bide its time for the right moment to exploit Bangladesh’s vulnerabilities.

 

Effective diplomacy extends beyond goodwill; it hinges on realpolitik. Without tangible leverage or hard power, a nation often negotiates from a disadvantaged position.

 

India stands to lose significantly, having backed a regime marked by corruption and severe human rights violations. It is viewed as complicit in eroding Bangladesh’s national integrity. To maintain the agreements established during Hasina’s administration, India will likely refrain from engaging with Bangladesh until it can find or manufacture an opportunity to capitalize on its weaknesses. At this point, gestures of goodwill and appeasement will likely only serve to further compromise Bangladesh’s standing.

 

Returning to the Hilsa fish, both India and Bangladesh are involved in its harvest. Bangladesh is not the sole provider of this sought-after delicacy, as India itself exports Hilsa to various nations. While the most prized Hilsa may come from the Padma River, the environmental health of this waterway cannot be overlooked. When has West Bengal raised concerns about the necessary water flow that sustains the river and enhances its breeding grounds for Hilsa? The depletion of essential water levels is evident. Which nation is responsible for obstructing the waterways of Bangladesh, contributing to an impending environmental crisis? Why does it seek fish from us while withholding vital water resources?

 

Considering the purchasing power in both Bangladesh and India, how many individuals can afford this expensive fish? Why not work toward making it more accessible and affordable for our populations?

 

What has Yunus achieved through this Hilsa diplomacy? Will West Bengal adopt a more amicable stance regarding our rightful share of water from the Padma, Jamuna, and Teesta rivers? Will Modi and Amit Shah reconsider their approach and reset the bilateral relationship on the principles of mutual respect and sovereignty? Will India cease to provide sanctuary for individuals connected to the Awami League’s oppressive regime? What tangible benefits does this diplomatic approach yield for Bangladesh, other than appearing submissive to an arrogant India that has historically undermined democracy?

 

The main instigator of the July massacre has found refuge in Delhi, where India has shown no qualms about sheltering a mass murderer while labeling her a friend. This situation reflects a troubling bipartisan consensus. India must decide between supporting the people of Bangladesh or its fascist ally, the Awami League.

 

The aspiration for Bangladesh’s second independence is paramount. India must acknowledge this reality; otherwise, cooperation will remain elusive. Hilsa is not the foundation upon which to rebuild these vital ties

- Tuhin sarwar