The Fate of Bangladesh’s Rivers and the Bait of Hilsa Diplomacy
The
interim government’s perplexing Hilsa export policy fails to inspire India’s
goodwill as it maintains its allegiance to its former vassal while attempting
to mend relations with its neighbor
On August
5, 2024, India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, was tasked with
overseeing a critical operation in Bangladesh. As the impending fall of Sheikh
Hasina loomed, he had only hours before protestors surged toward Gonobhaban.
After 15 years of unwavering Indian support, her tenure was nearing its end. A
safe exit was orchestrated, allowing her to flee to India.
India’s
decision to retain its most loyal regional ally only exacerbated tensions and
ignited further public dissent in Bangladesh. By choosing to protect a
dictator, India appeared to disregard the aspirations of those advocating for
democracy and human rights. Even in the wake of Hasina’s departure, India’s
stance reflected a continued indifference toward the ethos of the Monsoon
Revolution. In this context, Farida Akhter, an advisor in the interim
government, remarked that Bangladesh would no longer be able to export Hilsa to
India.
Despite
this, shortly before his inaugural foreign trip to the UN General Assembly,
Muhammad Yunus opted to send Hilsa to India. This decision is likely to be
interpreted unfavorably in New Delhi. Any optimism or naive expectations held
by Yunus's administration will likely be viewed as indecisiveness among its
advisors. This could signal weakness and the onset of an appeasement strategy.
India has
made its position clear: despite Dhaka’s requests, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
shows no interest in engaging with Yunus during the UN General Assembly. Indian
Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent remarks in Jharkhand, threatening to hang
“Bangladeshi infiltrators,” indicate a strategic intention to instill fear and
undermine the Bangladeshi government.
This
pattern is well-established. Since its independence, whenever Bangladesh has
had a government other than the Awami League, India has been known to
destabilize the situation. The contrast between India’s support for Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman and its attempts to disrupt Bangladesh after his assassination
in 1975—marked by numerous coup attempts—speaks volumes about this longstanding
dynamic.
For any
society to function effectively, it is essential to maintain law and order,
ensuring the community's safety and security. The current fragile state of law
and order in Bangladesh creates a scenario ripe for chaos and instability.
The Yunus
administration will likely find its focus diverted, unable to address pressing
issues or confront remnants of fascism domestically, nor effectively counter
India’s maneuvers internationally. In time, the government may feel compelled
to seek India’s favor to restore calm, while India will bide its time for the
right moment to exploit Bangladesh’s vulnerabilities.
Effective
diplomacy extends beyond goodwill; it hinges on realpolitik. Without tangible
leverage or hard power, a nation often negotiates from a disadvantaged
position.
India
stands to lose significantly, having backed a regime marked by corruption and
severe human rights violations. It is viewed as complicit in eroding
Bangladesh’s national integrity. To maintain the agreements established during
Hasina’s administration, India will likely refrain from engaging with
Bangladesh until it can find or manufacture an opportunity to capitalize on its
weaknesses. At this point, gestures of goodwill and appeasement will likely
only serve to further compromise Bangladesh’s standing.
Returning
to the Hilsa fish, both India and Bangladesh are involved in its harvest.
Bangladesh is not the sole provider of this sought-after delicacy, as India
itself exports Hilsa to various nations. While the most prized Hilsa may come
from the Padma River, the environmental health of this waterway cannot be
overlooked. When has West Bengal raised concerns about the necessary water flow
that sustains the river and enhances its breeding grounds for Hilsa? The
depletion of essential water levels is evident. Which nation is responsible for
obstructing the waterways of Bangladesh, contributing to an impending
environmental crisis? Why does it seek fish from us while withholding vital
water resources?
Considering
the purchasing power in both Bangladesh and India, how many individuals can
afford this expensive fish? Why not work toward making it more accessible and
affordable for our populations?
What has
Yunus achieved through this Hilsa diplomacy? Will West Bengal adopt a more
amicable stance regarding our rightful share of water from the Padma, Jamuna,
and Teesta rivers? Will Modi and Amit Shah reconsider their approach and reset
the bilateral relationship on the principles of mutual respect and sovereignty?
Will India cease to provide sanctuary for individuals connected to the Awami
League’s oppressive regime? What tangible benefits does this diplomatic
approach yield for Bangladesh, other than appearing submissive to an arrogant
India that has historically undermined democracy?
The main
instigator of the July massacre has found refuge in Delhi, where India has
shown no qualms about sheltering a mass murderer while labeling her a friend.
This situation reflects a troubling bipartisan consensus. India must decide
between supporting the people of Bangladesh or its fascist ally, the Awami
League.
The
aspiration for Bangladesh’s second independence is paramount. India must
acknowledge this reality; otherwise, cooperation will remain elusive. Hilsa is
not the foundation upon which to rebuild these vital ties
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